Misleading allocations and how to fix it–Part 1

Two things about which I warn my clients who buy manufacturing software are these:

1. Manufacturing software is capable of capturing, storing and reporting on reams of data
2. If you are not careful, you will find yourself taking “as fact” the data produced by the system and being mislead in your decision-making

Why is this so?

Because ERP systems allow the users to create allocations of overhead based on manufacturing “drivers.” In Sage 500 ERP’s case (as shown in the screen image below), the chosen driver is “labor hours”—for run time and set-up time.

In the Sage 500 ERP Set Up Work Center screen there are places for “Fixed Setup” costs and “Fixed Run” costs. The values placed here are used to absorb “Fixed” overhead costs at the rate supplied based on each hour of “Setup” or “Run” time calculated for production utilization of the Work Center.

The problem is that these “absorption rates” must be calculated based on historical (or prognosticated based on expected future) utilization rates of each Work Center. These calculations must make assumptions about product mix, work center utilization rates and operating expense levels. As soon as any of the these factors change

• Product mix
• Work center utilization rates
• Overhead expenses

The data supplied by the calculations will be wrong.

And, since either the product mix or the total of operating expenses will certainly be different than the numbers used in the calculations, the data resulting from the calculations will (virtually) always be wrong.

A simplified example

We are going to look at two different allocation methods and the decisions that might be derived from such calculations.

• Standard overhead allocations by Job (equivalent to allocation per work order in a manufacturing operation)
• Activity-Based Costing (ABC) allocation based on production hours

In order to make the allocations easy to follow, you will see that the company is a service company and that the firm has three partners (administrative overhead) and some relatively fixed overhead in the form of vehicle leases, maintenance and so forth.

The direct labor (production labor) comes from five employees who—to make it simple—all work exactly 200 hours per month and all make exactly the same rate—$10 per hour. This also gives “production” a known capacity—1,000 hours per month.

The partners have kept good track of their history over the last six months and have also done enough market research to have a good handle on the size of the market they are serving. They know, therefore, how many of each kind of job they have done each month (on average), as well as the market potential for the kinds of jobs they do.

STANDARD COST ALLOCATIONS (by Job)

In an attempt to leverage what they have learned by capturing data about past performance and, of course, to improve profitability, the partners do an analysis that includes a standard allocation of overhead to each job.

From this analysis, they discover that their most profitable jobs are landscaping jobs ($35 per job), followed closely by window cleaning jobs ($30 per job). So, they decide to satisfy the market demand in that order, using the resources they have (1,000 hours of production time).

Before we move on, note that with their present product mix, the company is producing a profit of $4,100 per month ($49,200 per year).

The results of this action are shown here:

Upon first glance, it appears that this has been a great move. Based on the calculations in the table, profit has moved from $4,100 per month to $7,200 per month!

Again, the problem is that since NO plumbing or gutter guard jobs were done, some of the overhead (allocated at $90 per job) was not absorbed in the calculations. The total overhead is $18,000 plus $9,000, or $27,000. But the 220 jobs only absorbed 220 times $90, or $19,800 in overhead. That leaves $7,200 in overhead NOT absorbed. Take that $7,200 away from the calculated profit of $7,200 and the company is actually worse off (zero profit) after having reallocated its resources to what appeared to be the “most profitable jobs.”

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[To be continued—be sure to watch for Part 2!]

Understanding the “chain” in supply chain management

After 30 years of growth and development, I am not at all certain that I would rename “supply chain management” to anything else. What I might try to do is to get people to recognize the real implications of the name it already has.

Let's look at that key middle word in the name: "chain."

Very few organization "manage" the supply chain as a "chain."

A great many managers and executives are content to manage only their "link" in the chain. If things don't go well, they may try to substitute one connected link for another (e.g., change vendors or find new customers, for example). But they do not recognize or manage the chain as a chain. They still manage pretty much within the four walls of their own "link" (i.e., company).

The important thing to understand about a "chain" is the interdependence of the links and that the strength of the entire chain is governed entirely by the strength of the weakest link in the chain.

The interdependence of a chain should drive organizations inexorably toward supply chain collaboration and, even further, toward a genuine mutuality. In many cases, the fastest, best and most secure way for organizations to improve their own profitability is to work together with other supply chain participants to strengthen the weakest link in the chain—not seeking to replace that link. That means that all the participants in the supply chain—or at least the strategic links—must be (or become) open to collaboration and even invite new ideas from other participants in the chain.

Collaboration and end-to-end data sharing can help end the damaging effects of "the bullwhip," help firms in the supply chain break their frequently misguided addiction to large batch sizes, and help redefine purchasing and pricing metrics that can lead to more frequent replenishment while holding both truly variable costs and operating expenses low for all the participants.

High-level meetings should be sought between executives and managers for all the critical players in the supply chain. The healthiest supply chains are those where all the participants are making satisfactory profits and a few strong players in the supply chain are not using their leverage to increase profits through policies that weaken other important links in the chain.

How can you tell when your "supply chain management" team is beginning to act like they are part of a "chain" and not just content to manage their own "link"? Look for the following signs:

1. Metrics and actions taken for improvement reach outside "our link" and efforts are made to optimize the "whole chain" by identifying and seeking to strengthen the weakest link.
2. Management up and down the supply chain have learned to not ignore the industry's larger ecosystem. They monitor the ecosystem for signs of impending change, manage proactively, and share information freely.
3. Supply chain managers recognize that there will always be a "weakest link" and, while seeking to strengthen the present "weakest link," learn to pace the flow of products by the "drum" of the present "weakest link." They also recognize that any loss of productivity at the present "weakest link" is productivity lost to the whole supply chain. (As a corollary, supply chain managers should recognize that time, energy and money spent strengthening links other than the present "weakest link" will not improve the performance of the "chain.")
4. Managers and executives involved in the supply chain have ceased using metrics stuck in "cost-world" thinking and have seen that it is synchronizing product flow and increasing throughput that lead to ongoing improvement and higher profits.
5. Supply chain managers have recognized that profits depend upon meeting customers' needs and demands, and that understanding these needs and demands is essential from product design forward through all the processes and links in the supply chain.
6. Collaboration across the supply chain begins with product design so that maximum external variety (end-products) can be achieved with minimal internal variety (raw materials, components and subassemblies).
7. Supply chain collaboration is leading to strategic flexibility in both products and the processes of maintaining supply chain flows.
8. Wherever possible, all along the supply chain, the flow of product is buffered with capacity rather than inventory. (Supply chain partners may make strategic capital investments in other parts of the supply chain to build needed capacities as part of the collaboration.)
9. Managers and executives involved in the supply chain have made it a priority to develop strategic alliances and partnerships all along the supply chain in order to recognize and strengthen the present "weakest link."
10. All across the supply chain, metrics focus on increasing throughput (not cutting costs).
11. Forecasts are still used for planning, but "pull" is used to drive all execution in the supply chain.
12. The focus is now on synchronizing the flow of product across the supply chain, not on balancing supply chain capacities.

ONE ADDITIONAL NOTE:

On the contrary side, some "big dogs" (or "big dog" wannabees) in the supply chain think they are managing "the chain," but they treat it more like a "leash." They yank their smaller suppliers around until their suppliers are either driven out of business or simply won't do business with the "big dogs" at all any more.

This kind of attitude is bad for business and bad for the economy in general. The best suppliers are profitable suppliers. If any organization is destroying the supply chain's profitability one link at a time, it is destroying its supply chain by weakening one link after another. These weak links will not have reserve capacities to respond to changes in demand or make up for supply chain losses when "Murphy" strikes.

P.S. - I was going to write on the other words (i.e., "supply" and "management"), but this is probably enough for now. Thanks.

Finding Common Ground Between CFO and COO–Part 6

[Continuation]

Now that we have laid the groundwork, let us begin our turn now to some specific strategies for uniting the CFO and the COO in common and practical actions. First, let us consider the proper priorities for action.

Priorities for Action

The CFO and COO should agree on the following general priorities for actions to be considered:

1. Efforts to Increase Throughput, including efforts to increase revenues and/or efforts to reduce Truly Variable Costs (TVCs)
   
2. Efforts to Reduce Inventories (or investments) or demands for new investments
   
3. Efforts to reduce Operating Expenses

“Why this order?” I hear you ask.

The Detrimental Effects Cost-World Thinking

Let me begin by saying that this order is based on the solid assumption that most companies—especially at this present time—have already trimmed away obvious waste in operating expenses. And, while most CFOs and COOs are focused on the “cost-cutting” as the road to higher profits, this is almost never the long-term result.

A study done some years ago regarding Fortune 500 companies found a trend: Among companies self-assessed themselves as being “cost-cutters,” nearly 40 percent of such companies were no longer in the Fortune 500 a decade or so later. Clearly, the focus on “cost-cutting” is wrong on the face of it.

Consider this: Any company can successfully reduce its “costs” and “operating expenses” to zero. It the easiest and simplest of maneuvers to be carried out jointly by the CFO and COO. All they have to do is close the doors to the business, fire everybody, liquidate everything, and go home. It’s done!

But, if you think I am being overly dramatic, consider the fact that cost-cutting is—by it’s very nature—an action driven inexorably by the law of diminishing returns. If the CFO and COO successfully collaborate to reduce costs and expenses by, say, ten percent in year one; then it will be very difficult to reduce costs and expenses by even five percent in year two while staying healthy. In year three it may be difficult to eek out a two-and-a-half percent reduction in costs and expenses. Each successive year, increasing profits through cost-cutting becomes more and more difficult.

Too soon, despite their very best efforts, the COO and CFO focused on cost-cutting are soon cutting away protective capacity and damaging the ability of the organization to recover from the occasional attacks of “Murphy” (Murphy’s Law). This, in turn, leads to reduced revenues and higher marketing costs as customer retention becomes that much more difficult over time.

For all of these reasons, we must agree to put efforts to reduce operating expenses at the bottom of the list. And because increasing throughput has no theoretical upper limit and is not affected by the law of diminishing returns, efforts to increase throughput should remain foremost in the thoughts of the CFO and COO seeking unified actions for ongoing improvement.

Clarifying Throughput

As a reminder, our working definition of Throughput is not some generic concept of increases in volume or output. It is carefully focused on a financial formula that the strategic CFO should readily accept:

Throughput = Revenue – Truly Variable Costs

Where Truly Variable Costs (TVCs) are restricted to those costs that vary directly (not through allocations or some estimated factors) with changes incremental revenues. Typically, TVCs would be found in raw materials, subcontract or other outside services paid for on a batch or per-unit basis, commissions, piece-rate pay for employees, and little else.

[To be continued…]

[Cross-posted at the Kinaxis Supply Chain Expert Community]

(c)2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 Richard D. Cushing

Finding Common Ground Between the CFO and COO–Part 1

It seems as though many organizations are at war within. During boom-times, the war is more subdued, but is still there. But in tough—really tough—economic times the war is more evident than ever.

What is that war?

The war is that age-old dispute between meeting customer service level demands and holding inventory levels within reason. In really tough times, keeping inventory levels down becomes even more critical to the CFO—and the organization’s survival, perhaps—because cash held in inventory for long periods of time puts a real crunch in the vital cash-flow of the firm.

Now, it is likely that the COO will surrender in times like these. He or she will understand that (too frequently) it really is a matter of survival to maintain the cash-flow. So, the COO might say something like:

“Okay. I get it. I’ll reduce inventories as much as I can. But don’t blame me if we can ship orders or keep our customers happy.”

What are your options?

Some have put it this way: In tough economic times you firm is going to

1. Sink,
2. Shrink, or
3. Prevail.

I prefer to put that into four categories. Furthermore, I do not believe that those four categories are applicable only in tough times. I believe that they are fully applicable to every business enterprise all of the time. Here they are shown in the figure below: 1) failing, 2) risking, 3) competing or 4) leading.

I believe the determining factors in every business enterprise are inherently simple and are only two in number:

1. Effectiveness – The measure of how effectively the firm employs the monies invested and how effectively does it spends its working capital in the process of turning inventory (or services) into throughput? This is a measure of managements effectiveness in managing its internal workings and the inbound side of the supply chain.
   
2. Differentiation – This is the measure of effective management is in dealing externally in the outbound side of the supply chain. This measure covers everything from R&D (research and development) through to marketing, sales and customer service.

The problem with these two terms (i.e., effectiveness and differentiation) is not that they are hard to grasp. Everyone seems to know in a very general way that they need to manage the firm to be effective in using its resources and that, in order to be profitable, they need to differentiate themselves in the marketplace.The problem is that many people seem to have difficulty these two words into concrete and effective actions.

So, let me restate the same figure using a different set of terms.

Note that I have redefined the two factors as follows:

1. Effectiveness = Increasing Throughput
   
   and
   
2. Differentiation = Breadth of Market through Irrefusable Offers

But, in dealing with my clients, I go beyond that. I use Eliyahu Goldratt’s definition of throughput:

Throughput (T) = Revenues – Truly Variable Costs (TVC)

Now, simplicity is at the root of this whole approach.

I know the CFO needs to do certain things to satisfy other executives, the bank, investors, and others. I know he needs to do some relatively complex allocations of operating expenses to costs for various reasons.

But, the COO needs to have a way to tell his people—from sales to shipping—how to easily differentiate good actions from bad actions. And, those fancy allocations just get in the way—muddying up the waters—when it comes to decision-making in operations.

We will take a look at that relatively simple equation for throughput again. But before we do, we need to define another term: TVC.

Truly Variable Costs (TVC) are limited to those costs that vary in an absolute way with incremental changes in revenues. Typically, TVCs are limited to a few categories:

1. Raw materials
2. Contract labor or outside services paid for on a piece-rate or batch-rate
3. Commissions

You will note that so-called “direct labor” is not a part of TVCs. Here’s why: If your company sells, on average, 100,000 widgets a month, does your labor actually vary if, in month one you sell only 80,000 widgets and in month two you sell 130,000 widgets? In month one was your labor bill on 80 percent of “average,” and was it 130 percent of “average” in month three?

Probably not. Labor is an operating expense that does not vary directly with changes in revenues.

Given that premise for TVCs and going back to our formula, there are really only three (3) ways to increase throughput:

1. Increase revenues
2. Decrease TVCs
3. Increase revenues and decrease TVCs

Meanwhile, back at the war…

One of the problems with (the many times unspoken) “war” between the CFO and the COO is that when they do reach common ground, it is all too often found only in “cost-cutting” rather than looking at ways to increase revenues.

The reason for this leap to common ground, of course, is made most clear by my first figure: typically, both the CFO and the COO feel more prepared and confident in dealing with the internal operations than with all the nebulous factors that lie outside the organization. So, dealing with internal effectiveness trumps trying to achieve higher levels of market differentiation—especially in challenging times.

[To be continued…]

Business Intelligence, CPM and the Middle-Market

I want to take a moment to thank CFO Magazine for inviting me to be a part of the social media coverage for their 2011 Corporate Performance Management Conference in Dallas. It was, indeed, my pleasure and my privilege to be a part of this foray of theirs into social media connections with their audience, and I trust that they will continue to expand the application of social media in connection with their helpful events.

So, what did I learn while at this conference?

I learned much.

• I learned that there is a broad and increasing array of tools available for businesses to leverage as they begin or expand the business intelligence and corporate performance management efforts in their organizations.
  
• I learned that there is considerable confusion in the CPM (corporate performance management) marketplace over the application of various terms including “budgets” versus “forecasts”; the differences, similarities or where the line falls between “business intelligence” and “corporate performance management”; or even whether simply having a “budgeting” or “forecasting” system in place means that you are practicing “CPM”.
  
• I learned that many, many organizations in the small-to-mid-sized enterprise marketplace are increasingly sensible to the need for improved visibility and insights regarding their own businesses, the industries in which they participate, and the broader economics that affect them, their customers and their suppliers. Managers and executives are, therefore, turning to “business intelligence” to aid them in finding the answers they think they need.
  
• I learned that despite the tremendous interest in the middle-market for adventuring into business intelligence and CPM, most middle-market participants are still on the sidelines, mostly because they just don’t know where to start. At the same time, they are not yet convinced of an immediate ROI if they jump-in feet first.
  
• I learned that many organizations feel that they can do BI and CPM with Microsoft® Excel™ and/or Access™ and save “a ton of money” while still reaping the ROI rewards.
  
• I learned that most participants in major “forecast” and “budget” initiatives know that their processes are being undermined by “sandbagging” and “gaming,” but feel (more or less) helpless to stop these practices.
  
• I learned that when mandates are handed down from on-high (say, a parent company or corporate HQ for a division) saying, “We need you to do X next year,” that even the financial executives in the subsidiary company or division will “game the system” to satisfy the mandate—whether or not the “gaming” reflects reality.
  
• I learned that the vast majority of middle-market financial managers are still entrapped in cost-world thinking. Such executives and managers are far less likely to engage BI and CPM to discover ways to increase Throughput, and are far more likely to spend their time, energy and money in pursuit of the diminishing returns of cost-cutting.

Apart from the conference, my experience in working with an array of middle-market firms tells me that a great many executives and financial managers fall into one of two very large camps:

1. Those who feel they have no need for business intelligence or a comprehensive program of corporate performance management because they already know and understand all they need to know about their firm, how it operates, the industry(ies) in which they participate and the affects of the economy at large on their business.
   
2. Those who have set up some spreadsheets to analyze certain factors of their business and who, perhaps, actually create an annual budget. Many of these, therefore, feel like they are already doing “business intelligence” and “analytics” and “CPM.” Such folks generally have a sense that there is no significant ROI for them in doing more.

Given all of these different factors, I think it is good—an imperative, in fact—that organizations like CFO Magazine are sponsoring events and stimulating more conversation on these topics—especially in the middle market where most of the confusion appears to reside.

Let me hear your thoughts.

The Dangerous Dichotomy—Part 3

[Continued]

The conclusion of the preceding article was that, without doubt, reducing out-of-stock occurrences will tend to increase revenues. Increasing revenues will certainly satisfy the sales and marketing team, who have been mandated by the firm’s executives with doing that very thing. But, the question remains, can actions be taken to reduce out-of-stock occurrences in such a way that will satisfy what should be everyone’s goal of helping the business make more money tomorrow than it is making today?

We believe it can.

Consider a distributor that buys products from Pacific rim suppliers. One line of products produces gross profits of about 80 percent. Of the costs associated with this product line, about 15 percent are the actual product cost (including any taxes and duties). The remaining five percent are the costs per unit of shipping the product by ship from its source to the firm’s distribution centers.

Like the product in the example provided in the preceding article (see “The Dangerous Dichotomy—Part 2”), this line comes in an array of styles (or color or sizes). Some of these variants sell better than others, naturally. However, because the distributor (wrongly) believe that they are stuck with a three-month or longer lead-time to get these products, they feel that they must forecast demand well in advance and place their orders based solely on this forecast.

The three-month lead time consists of the time it takes to produce enough product to fill a container (or meet some other policy-based “cost-saving” arrangement), plus the time for ocean-going transportation, and the time to get it takes to get the items through customs and provide land transportation to the destination distribution centers. But, because the forecast is always wrong, the firm inevitably finds itself in the situation we described in “The Dangerous Dichotomy—Part 2”; that is, they experience out-of-stocks on several of the variants while being overstocked on several other varieties of the product.

The firm is aware that they can ship these items by air—in much smaller quantities, of course. However, doing so doubles the per-unit cost of shipping these products.

When managers hear that simple phrase: “Shipping by air doubles our freight costs,” that is usually all they need to hear. They think of those “slashed margins” and “higher costs” and that is where the conversation ends.

But, consider this: Doubling the per-unit cost of shipping on this product line reduces the margin from 80 percent to 75 percent. Sure, that is, in fact, a reduction in profit margins on this product line.

Now, consider this: Shipping by air forces shipment in smaller batches. The smaller batches in the shipments mean that the manufacturer can produce the batches for shipment in less time—perhaps as short a time as a few days. Shorter lead times mean the original forecast and the original order need only cover the starter stock—the stock to be sold while the firm figures out what styles or colors are going to be the “big-sellers.”

When the “big-sellers” are known, replenishment stock can be ordered and shipped by air, but the firm is likely to actually make more money than they did when they were paying lower shipping costs.

Why?

The reason is simple: At a 75 percent gross margin and a five percent increase in shipping costs—between multi-mode sea-land transportation and air transportation—every additional sale (resulting from reduced out-of-stocks on the popular models) covers the difference in shipping costs for 15 units (i.e., 75 percent gross margin divided by the five percent increase in shipping costs).

Besides the obvious advantage found in the extremely high likelihood of increased profits—despite “doubling your shipping costs” and suffering “reduced margins”—this thoughtful approach has all of the following advantages, as well:

1. Happier and more satisfied customers
2. Less likelihood of customers being lost to competitive sources
3. Fewer lost customers means the firm is more likely to be able to sustain revenues with lower marketing costs
4. A happier and more productive sales and marketing staff—able to spend their time capturing new customers and markets instead of appeasing disgruntled customers who could not buy the product they wanted
5. A happier and more productive organization overall—with less in-fighting and a real sense of success and accomplishment
6. More satisfied management and executive team
7. A far greater opportunity for success in the future

All of these benefits accrue to an organization that discovers “system thinking” (i.e., seeing their organization as a whole, rather than as disconnected pieces and departments). Meanwhile, the firm still caught in “the dangerous dichotomy” is still fighting fires day-by-day and trying to keep the smoldering animosity between the factions from breaking out into open warfare.

Makes you want to give “system thinking” a try, doesn’t it?

The Dangerous Dichotomy—Part 2

[Continued]

In the preceding article we discussed how—all too frequently—management inadvertently creates a schizophrenic organization by assigning responsibility for increasing revenues to one part of the organization while assigning cost-cutting to another part of the organization. Usually the other part of the organization is everyone else—everyone not assigned to the task of increasing revenues.

What happens in such cases, is that the business is driven to a dichotomy that tends to pull the organization apart.

Of course, this effect of pulling the organization apart is entirely unintentional. Management wants to move the business toward greater profits and profitability. Sales and marketing—those generally commissioned with increasing revenues want the organization to succeed and grow. And, all the others, whose marching orders are to cut costs also really want the company to find success. So they are doing their best to keep costs down.

Nevertheless, seeming unreasonable demands made by sales and marketing are a nearly constant irritation to inventory and production managers. And what appears to be the simple inability of folks in purchasing, production, scheduling, warehouse and shipping to get their house in order so that sales and marketing can achieve their goals of increasing revenues is a cause of very real frustrations.

So, even though everyone in the organization really wants to move the organization toward success, it is clear that no one in it has a view of what it takes to make the whole organization—the whole “system”—move in the desired direction. Those who are instructed to “increase revenues” have no real view or interest in holding the line on costs or operating expenses. But, what is worse, those who have been instruction to “cut costs” generally have no visibility into what it might take to increase revenues. They are not privy to the “levers” that might affect increasing sales. Plus, the various departments involved in “cost cutting” are quite often, themselves, fragmented in their view of what it takes to be effective.

A simple example

Let’s take one simple example relative to supply chain thinking.

Most businesses vastly underestimate their losses from what they too frequently believe is a good thing. When they say, “Folks, we sold out of product X!” they are frequently thinking: “This is great! ‘Sold-out’ means we have lower inventories! It means we sold more than we expected to sell!” or similar thoughts.

But look at the results of out-of-stock conditions in the example above.

First, everyone needs to recognize that the things that “sell-out” are the most popular items. Second, because these are the most popular items, there is no reliable way to know how many more units the firm might have sold if they had had more units in stock. Certainly extrapolating from “average sales” is insufficient.

In our example (above), a product comes in five styles (‘A’ through ‘E’). The firm chose to stock 280 of each of these five styles and the quantities actually sold are found in the “Qty Sold” column.

In our scenario we are supplying what cannot actually be known—that is, the actual market potential (“Mkt Potential”) for each style. In this case, the firm ended up selling-out of two styles (‘C’ and ‘D’), while being overstocked on Styles ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘E’. Extrapolating from “Average Sales” one might believe that the firm lost $5,400 in revenues. However, when calculated from “market potential” for each style, the actual amount surrendered in lost revenues due to being sold-out calculates to $12,900—more than double the estimated losses from averages.

Of course, this lost-sales number is a guess—since there is no reliable way to know the actual market demand for a sold-out item. But, what is not a guess is that when a business is out-of-stock on a popular item, it is almost certainly also losing sales on other items when customers go elsewhere for the items they are seeking. Plus, every time a customers goes shopping somewhere else, the “out-of-stock” business stands a good chance of losing the customer to another supplier.

Doubtless, reducing out-of-stock occurrences will increase revenues. That will help satisfy the sales and marketing team in our troubling dichotomy above. But, the question remains, can that be done in such a way that will satisfy what should be everyone’s goal: helping the business make more money tomorrow than it is making today?

[To be continued]

The Dangerous Dichotomy - Part 1

Far too many business executives have created an artificial dichotomy within their own organization that is potentially dangerous to their firm's survival and almost certainly destructive of profits. What is that artificial dichotomy, I hear you ask?

The answer is simple: Businesses all too frequently put the responsibility for increasing revenues into the hands of one part of their organization, while putting an entirely different group--usually most of the rest of the organization--in charge of reducing costs.

While, on the surface, this may seem to make sense; it really does not.

Here's why.

The Revenue-Increasing Group
The folks in the organization put in charge of increasing revenues--usually the sales and marketing departments--generally are measured only on the things pertaining to revenues. Because it is not a part of their reward metric, the folks in sales and marketing are, therefore, wont to make decisions that may:

1. Increase the costs of production
2. Drive inventories up
3. Increase operating expenses
4. Reduce output

Now, they don't do these things intentionally. They are just trying to do what they have been mandated to do by management and senior executives.

But, if increases in revenue are stymied or shrunken by, say...

1. Failures to meet delivery-time promises
2. Out-of-stock conditions on finished goods or components
3. Lay-offs or cut-backs in production, warehousing or elsewhere

Then, the revenue-increasing group has an "out" for not performing up to expectations or forecasts. Their excuses are generally based on the performance of the other part of the organization.

The Cost-Cutting Group
The other part of the organization is, as I said, usually all the rest of the organization. These folks have all been instructed and, frequently, are being measured based on "keeping costs down." There interest is in doing everything they can to...

1. Keep the costs of production down
2. Holding inventory levels as low as possible
3. Making sure that operating expenses are minimized

These parts of the organization's management also want the organization to succeed. But they are not being measured based on the organization's (the "system's") success. They are being measure on their performance against budgets for costs and expenses.

The folks working in these other departments have no malice of intent, but when sales and marketing brings a request to engineering or production that is going to increase the costs of production, they are not likely to look too kindly upon the idea. When sales tells these folks that they could sell more if they just had more inventory, they may nod their heads in affirmation, but the are not likely to take affirmative action because they aren't rewarded for that effort. To the contrary, they are more likely to be rewarded for holding inventory levels down and increasing inventory turns.

So, the battle rages
And, of course, the battle does not end there. When cost-cutting fails to make the firm more profitable, this group is just as willing and able to point fingers at the "sales guys," and point out how their frequent interventions, their calls to change production or shipping priorities, and their demands that end-of-period orders "get out the door" prevent serious cost-cutting by...

1. Driving overtime expenses up
2. Increasing requirements for both raw material and finish goods inventories
3. Reducing production by breaking up shop floor production runs with new priorities on a daily basis

 Hence, these two separate factions--who should be working toward a single end--are first formed by management and then each becomes the excuse for the other for non-performance. Meanwhile, the firm as a whole suffers reduced profits, higher operating expenses, and--generally speaking--too much inventory (made even more unbearable by having too little of the things that the customers want when they want them).

To be continued...
If your organization is not presently experiencing this warfare--even if subtle or boiling just beneath the surface of a "mask" of "team work"--then you are a fortunate one and, more likely than not, you know a firm or have worked in a firm where this is or was true.

This internal conflict is evidence of the lack of "system thinking." When executives give different directives to different parts of the organization--in the hope of squeezing some profit out of "local optima," rather than global metrics that encompass the goal of the whole system--the whole organization--this is what one must expect.

There is an answer.

[Continued next post....]

On Seeking Success

In a recent informal poll I conducted, I asked "Which ERP success is most important to your organization in the long run?" I offered the following options:

1. An ERP project that is on-time and within budget
2. An ERP project that increased throughput (i.e., revenues less truly variable costs)
3. An ERP project that reduces inventories or the need for other investments
4. An ERP project that reduces operating expenses

I was somewhat dismayed when the results were that fully two-thirds of respondents count success in ERP as a project that reduces operating expenses. The only worse answer, in my opinion, would have been "An ERP project that is on-time and within budget."

Here's why I believe that is true.

First, consider that I can dramatically reduce the operating expenses of any business enterprise virtually over night -- saving the organization, perhaps, millions of dollars every year -- and I can guaranty those results. All I have to do close the business. That automatically reduces operating expenses to zero.

If an organization is seeking "success," and they are making progress in that direction. It would seem to me that they would want more and more of whatever it is that they are calling "success." That would just make common sense, would it not?

But executives and managers that pin their "success" hopes on "reducing operating expenses" want only "partial success." Few of them are really endeavoring to reduce operating expenses to the "ultimate prize" of zero dollars.

What is worse is that they constantly face the law of diminishing returns. If they reduced operating expenses last year by five percent, the chances that they can reduce costs this year by another five percent are pretty slim, and even if they do, this year's five percent will still be a smaller actual dollar amount than last year's five percent. And next year will require even more effort for less dollar-savings.

However, for people caught in cost-world thinking, this does not seem foolish. They see no contradiction or futility in these efforts (sadly), ususually because that is all they know or have been taught to think.

On the other end of the spectrum are those one-in-three executives and managers who have discovered that real and enduring success comes from the "throughput" side of the business. If you can increase T (Throughput, which is Revenues less Truly Variable Expenses) this year by five percent -- all else being equal -- then you have made gains. In fact, if operating expenses have not increased, then that five percent increase in T falls directly to the bottom line just like a five percent reduction in operating expenses does.

What is even more exciting is the fact that there is no law of diminishing returns at this end of the enterprise. If you are able to increase T by five percent next year, that five percent will bring more dollars of profit to the bottom line than last year's five percent increase did. And next year's five percent will make an even larger contribution to stakeholders in the business.

Success on this end of the business -- if repeated year after year -- leads to real success, not "closing the business" (as "ultimate success" in reducing operating expenses does).

So, why are not more managers and executives seeking ERP success differently?

Taking the Easy Way (Down and) Out

In a LinkedIn group discussion today, many people were offering advice regarding how to save a small business that has been struggling due to the recession.  There has been no shortage of advice.  However, one comment today really stuck out to me. Here is what the contributor had to say:

A company is making 1 million a year.
From that it makes 10,000 profit (1%).
Each sale yields 25% return - i.e. if you sell 1,000 250 is profit.
To double its profit it can:
1. Reduce costs by 10%
2. Increase sales by 40%
Do the math(s). Which is easier?

Now, perhaps this example was intended to demonstrate what a clearly bloated and, likely, wasteful company really looks like. After all, the firm is grossing $250,000 on $1 million in revenues, but net profits are only $10,000 (1%).  That means that the firm is spending $240,000 (99%) on “expenses.”

If this is true – that the company really is bloated and wasteful – then, by all means, the quick and easy way to making more money is to “reduce costs by 10%.” It may even be likely for a $1 million revenue company that is spending $240,000 in expenses that $24,000 could be cut out and not do a bit of damage to the firm’s ability to survive and thrive.

The real state of things

For better or for worse, most small businesses today do not have a profit-and-loss statement that looks anything like that – at least not in terms of being bloated and wasteful. Most of the SMBs (small-to-mid-sized businesses) that I encounter are already running a pretty tight ship. There is no extravagance left in the firm’s operating expenses and, typically, they have already cut back on staffing so that many of the folks in the organization are working long hours and have taken on multiple duties so that fewer people are needed to keep things running. These organizations do not have any “fat” left to trim away. If they seek to cut expenses by even five percent (5%), it would mean cutting away “muscle and bone” – the strength that has allowed the organization to survive until today.

Cost-cutting may have gotten here

If management in such organizations are trapped in cost-world thinking, it could be that cost-cutting is what helped bring them to the brink of destruction, as it is. Here is how cost-world thinking can take a executives and managers astray and lead them to make decisions that are damaging to the organization:

Misleading allocations of overhead expenses

Using the figures offered by the contributor to the discussion (above), this company believes it has a gross profit of 25% ($250 for every $1,000 in revenues). Let us say that this is being calculated in the following (traditional) manner:

Cost Classification	Cost Amount
Raw materials	$250.00
Direct Labor	$100.00
Allocation of indirect costs and overhead	$400.00
Total Calculated Cost of Product	$750.00

For the sake of simplicity, let us say that each “widget” sells for a price of $1,000, so we have the following:

	Amount
Unit Revenue	$1,000.00
Unit Cost (incl. allocations)	$750.00
Calculated Gross Profit per Unit	$250.00

Also, let us assume that, due to the recession, this company also has excess capacity at this time.  (Otherwise, how could their operating expenses possibly be $240,000 on revenues of $1 million?)

Opportunity knocks

Now, one of this firm’s salespeople comes back from a long discussion with a potential new customer in Europe. This firm wants to buy up all the remaining capacity at the firm. That means 1,200 units. However, they are only willing to pay $650 per unit.  What should the company do?

Far too many executives caught up in cost-world thinking would turn this offer down. They would say, “We can’t take a loss of $100 per unit and ‘make it up’ in volume! That’s crazy!”

But, let us look at what is really happening. The company already has excess capacity. It could produce the additional 1,200 units without investing in any new facilities or equipment. Furthermore, it would not add to operating expenses, because no additional back-office staff would be required and no overtime is expected to meet the new demand. So, here is a contrast between cost-world thinking and reality:

COST-WORLD THINKING	Amount
Unit Revenue	$650.00
Cost-world Cost	$(750.00)
Gross Margin per Unit	$(100.00)
Number of Units Sold	1,200
Gross Profit from Offer	$(120,000)
Gross Profit from Current Operations	$250,000
Total Gross Profit	$130,000
Operating Expenses	$(240,000)
Net Profit	$(110,000)

Throughput Thinking

THROUGHPUT THINKING	Amount
Unit Revenue	$650.00
Truly Variable Costs (TVCs) (Raw Materials)	$(250.00)
Throughput per Unit	$400.00
Number of Units Sold	1,200
Change in Throughput from Offer	$480,000
Throughput from Current Operations	$250,000
Total Throughput	$730,000
Operating Expenses	$(240,000)
Net Profit	$490,000

Escaping from cost-world thinking

Here is a simple formula to help rescue firms from making the error we have illustrated above:

Where ROI = Return on Investment,
delta-T = Change in Throughput, where T = Revenue less Truly Variable Costs (TVCs),
delta-OE = Change in Operating Expenses, and
delta-I = Change in Inventory or Investment

In this case, we have determined that the change in OE = zero, and for simplicity’s sake, we have also assumed that the change in Inventory or Investment is zero (or negligible).

Essentially, when looked at properly this offer to “sell below cost,” actually increases the firm’s net profit by $480,000 with virtually zero investment. (In a real situation, some change in inventory is likely, but the effects would still be small.)

I trust this sheds new light on your business situation. Contact me at rcushing@GeeWhiz2ROI.com if you’d like to have help getting a better view of your business and how to make more money.

©2010 Richard D. Cushing

The New ERP – Part 33

One of the things I try to do in working with a new team of executives and managers is to get them to enlarge their view of their own organization – their own enterprise. I encourage them to think in terms of potential and not just the results they are beholding today.

Most managers and executives think in terms of "forecasts" versus "actuals." In their minds, they compare forecast sales with actual sales, and they compare forecast profits with actual profits. But what the enterprise is really giving up is not the difference between "forecast" and "actual." What the firm is actually giving up – what the enterprise is actually losing – is the difference between their actual profit and the full profit potential for the firm. These losses are irrecoverable – gone forever – as a lost opportunity.

Cost-world thinking

If you are like most folks in management, you've heard the oft-repeated mantra of the cost-world: "Every dollar of cost (or expense) that is cut falls directly to the bottom line." This makes sense because it is true.

Unfortunately, this concept is a very constrictive, and sometimes misleading, fact when taken by itself.

Three or four decades ago, it was possible for companies to actually "cut costs" in a way that made, in some cases, a real difference. New technologies – not necessarily computer-related – were making companies more efficient. Competition from abroad just beginning to emerge in a good many industries, and real waste had to be cut away to stay profitable as prices fell.

By the 1980s and into the 1990s, most U.S. companies had already completed (or were wrapping up) major cost-cutting efforts. By this time, executives and managers had trimmed a good deal of the true waste available in their systems. Attempts to reduce costs further frequently butt heads with the law of diminishing returns: the efforts to reduce costs further simply do not produce enough benefits on the bottom-line to make them economically sensible to undertake.

Cost-Cutting Period	Est. Cost to Implement	Savings	Change in Profit
Pre-1980 Cost-Cutting	$10,000	$80,000	15%
1980 - 1999 Cost-Cutting	$20,000	$25,000	4%
21st Century Cost-Cutting	$30,000	$10,000	2%

Actually, the real picture gets worse than this simple chart of diminishing returns.

Understanding protective capacity

Every business entity or other functional organization has two types of capacities: First, there is the organizations core capacity. This is the capacity the organization calls upon day-in and day-out to meet its normal workload. However, surrounding your enterprise's core capacity is another layer of capacity that is automatically generated. No deliberate act of management created this layer of capacity and its appearance varies dramatically from firm to firm. We refer to this capacity as protective capacity, and it is this capacity that is called upon whenever "Murphy" attacks and disrupts the organization's ability to meet its normal day-to-day demands. When protective capacity engages, it causes resources in the organization to work harder, faster, longer, more efficiently or in other ways to meet short-term requirements. It causes the organization the "sprint" to catch up at a pace that is unsustainable in the long-run.

Note: Some organization's have a third type of capacity: namely, excess capacity. We will address that capacity in a few moments.

During cost-cutting cycles, many management teams fail to recognize the presence of and need for the organization's protective capacity. When this happens, such firms run the risk of cutting away, not "fat," but protective capacity that is necessary to the maintenance of the organization in the long-term.

If protective capacity is, in fact, trimmed away during cost-cutting actions, the natural reaction of the organization is to shrink core capacity in order to rebuild the layer of protective capacity and thus protect itself against "Murphy." The resulting reductions in core capacity will have several ill effects on the enterprise:

• A reduced capacity to recover from business disruptions
  
• A reduced capacity to meet periods of unusually high demand
  
• A reduced capacity to emerge rapidly or successfully from economic recessions
  
• A reduced capacity to take advantage of unanticipated opportunities
  

Understanding excess capacity

During cost-cutting cycles, what executives and managers are frequently looking to efface from the organization is what might be deemed "excess capacity." But, if management will stop to consider, what might be classified as "excess capacity," is really the capacity in your organization that is unconstrained and which your management team has not yet exploited in the production of Throughput and profit. It is precisely that capacity that your enterprise has been paying for all along but failing to reap the benefits of leveraging it toward reaching the firm's full potential.

Cutting is always easier than thinking, but thinking is generally the more profitable.

Consider how Federal Express got its name. As I understand it, Frederick Smith, founder of FedEx had developed the concepts behind such an overnight courier service in college. When he got ready to put his ideas into action, he bought or leased some airplanes and hired some pilots, on the one hand, while negotiating with the U.S. Federal Reserve system on a contract to courier money and documents between the banks of the Fed on an overnight basis. However, just he was about to put it all together, the Fed backed out of the deal. That left Smith a lot of excess capacity in the nature of airplanes and pilots. The name "FedEx" stuck, but Smith put the excess capacity to work in private commerce by developing offers that made economic sense to his customers while creating new Throughput.

Had Frederick Smith been a "cost-cutter" rather than a visionary and an entrepreneur, FedEx may have fallen by the wayside instead of becoming the firm it is today.

©2009 Richard D. Cushing

The New ERP – Part 31

Cost-world thinking

It is clear that in the traditional ERP – Everything Replacement Project world virtually everyone is deeply mired in cost-world thinking. Lip-service is paid to terms like "investment" and "return on investment," but is all too evident that executives and managers consider information technologies (IT) an "expense" or a "cost" and, sadly, not an investment. What is worse, however, is that technology vendors and value-added resellers (VARs) have willingly opted into this same cost-world thinking.

Vendors and VARs would simply love to talk to their prospects and clients about ROI (return on investment). However, even if they tried in the recesses of the dark past, they soon gave up, and the reason they gave up is because their prospects simply never believed the ROI numbers that these vendors and VARs presented.

Why didn't these executives and managers believe the ROI numbers provided by the VARs?

The answer is simple and complex at the same time.

It's the sales guy

I think, clearly, the first reason that VAR-developed ROI calculations are generally not believed is simply because they come from "the sales guy." Every executive and manager in the prospect's office knows that "the sales guy" is here to sell us something. What that implies is that the prospect clearly believes that the VAR – and "the sales guy" – is in their office for one, and only one, reason: to line their own pockets with cash taken directly from the prospect company's bank accounts. The prospect company's management team is likely to conclude that the calculations provided by the VAR's "sales guy" – usually predicated on averages and formulas – have little bearing on reality in their own company.

This is compounded by the fact that, up to this point in the relationship between the VAR and the prospect, nothing of substance has really been discussed about specific changes in the prospect's operations – supported by the new technologies – that would induce the prospect to believe that the calculations done by the VAR constitute anything more than a "guess" for their specific situation.

It is nothing more than "mystical mojo" to suggest to a management team that the following transaction will lead to ROI for the buyer:

1. Buyer gives Seller $250,000
   
2. Seller provides and implements new technologies
   
3. Buyer gives Seller an extra $75,000 for budget overruns
   
4. Buyer "mystically" improves and makes more money because they have new technologies
   

This is nothing less than a witch-doctor approach – in the absence of solid discussions about

• What need to change to make the company more profitable
  
• What should the change look like in order to make the company more profitable
  
• How can we effect the proper change in the company in order to make the company more profitable
  

Up to this point, the VAR has delivered nothing more than promises to the management team in the prospective company. The prospect has no reason – literally – to believe that the VAR can deliver anything of value, and the horror stories abound of traditional ERP failures and cost-overruns. On what rational basis should the executives at the prospect company believe the ROI calculations provided by "the sales guy"?

Too many ROI discussions are disingenuous

Since (like good old Ivory soap) VARs are 99.44% purely mired in cost-world thinking – just like their counterparts on the management team at the typical prospect firm – when they talk about ROI they are almost always talking about "cost savings." However, at the root of it, these discussions are disingenuous.

Sad, but true, usually neither the VAR nor the prospect's executives will bring up the fact that calculated "cost-savings" based on reducing labor are almost entirely fictitious in the absence of the VARs ability to convince the prospect firm that they will also see substantial growth in Throughput as a result of the new technology deployment. It is relatively easy to throw that labor "savings" number into the calculations, but very, very few firms are actually going to lay people off or reduce their working hours following a traditional ERP – Everything Replacement Project deployment. Therefore, in the absence of significant and sustainable growth in Throughput, wherein additional personnel need not be hired, there are no real "cost savings" to the organization from the "labor" portion of the VAR's ROI estimates.

"The sales guys" frequently ignore this fact in their discussions with the prospect's team – because they do not have an answer for increasing Throughput. Meanwhile, some or all on the prospect's management team know and understand the fiction underlying the VAR's ROI calculations and, because of this recognized but unacknowledged fiction in the numbers, they are wary about accepting any portion of the VAR's ROI numbers.

Even if the ROI estimates are correct…

There is another major factor that plays into the executives and managers of prospective buyers of traditional ERP failing to place much value on VAR-provided ROI estimates. That is simply the lousy (I would like to use another word here, but this is probably the most appropriate word without collapsing into vulgarity) performance of traditional ERP in terms of actually delivering promised business benefits. Consider the following. Despite spending an average of $2.6 million (Microsoft) to $16.8 million (SAP) and taking about 18 months to implement (average), traditional ERP projects:

• Take longer than expected to implement 93% of the time – thus delaying business benefits and reducing ROI
  
• Exceed original budget expectations 59% of the time – thus reducing ROI
  
• Only about 21% of traditional ERP efforts effectively realize at least 50% of the anticipated business benefits – thus dramatically reducing the likelihood of achieving any ROI at all
  
• The average achievement of business value for traditional ERP deployments is only 68.6% –thus, ROI, if any, should be estimated using about two-thirds of earlier calculations
  

Is it any wonder that most prospects for traditional ERP – Everything Replacement Projects are a bit jaundiced about ROI figures coming from the vendor or VAR?

There is an answer. Stay tuned.

©2009 Richard D. Cushing

Curbing Fleet Costs - Budgeting & Planning - CFO.com

Curbing Fleet Costs - Budgeting & Planning - CFO.com

Despite the mindset of cost-cutting in economic hard-times, it can be dangerous. It is possible to cut away "meat" while you think you're slashing only "fat." When you cut away protective capacity, you make recovery more difficult when the economy improves.

Better: Apply the Thinking Processes and increase Throughput while reducing Inventories or the demand for new Investment, and cut or hold the line on Operating Expenses while sustaining real growth in revenues.

To find out how, contact me at rcushing(at)ceoexpress(dot)com.

...

The New ERP – Part 22

What else might change the value proposition of a technology initiative?

We have already pointed out the foibles of the traditional "aim-and-shoot" approach to IT initiatives and their proclivity toward considering every matter in terms of "cost," rather than "value." (See prior post in this series.) We even pointed out some of the factors that may change the value proposition for an IT initiative well after the project launch. But, what else might have an effect on the value proposition of an IT project aimed at "improving" a company like yours?

Earlier we mentioned things like the introduction of new products, changes in the economy, or even public policy changes that might change the value proposition for a technology deployment. Now, however, we need to turn our eye to technology-specific elements that might also affect the value proposition of a project already underway.

I am not sure why, but my more than 25 years in dealing with business technologies has clearly proven to me that firms reaching out to make technology purchases assume (far too frequently) some measure of clairvoyance on the part of their technology vendors. It is clear, and the purchasing companies' management teams seem to recognize, that they cannot know everything there is to know about the technology they are buying. However, that same management team will somehow come to the tacit conclusion that the technology vendor must know and understand all there is to know about the company that wishes to buy and deploy their technology.

Okay! Maybe I'm exaggerating; but just a tiny bit.

The managers on the buying side may not actually assume that the vendor's team understands or knows everything about the buying company's firm and operations, but they generally do assume that the vendor's team knows and understands enough about the prospective purchaser's company and operations to ask every possible question in order to assure that every facet of the product or services provided will fit precisely the customer's expectations. Never mind that "expectations" are never plainly visible to either party in the transaction. Expectations far transcend anything placed in any agreement or "requirements" document. Expectations may be reduced to the number of mouse-clicks it takes to navigate a certain transaction, or the "look-and-feel" of screens, or where data is placed in the user interface. The list of expectations is, literally, without end. In fact, the purchasers themselves may not know or be able to articulate their expectations. They only know when their expectations have not been met.

The point is this: As a buyer, you and your management team need to recognize that, when first engaging a technology vendor, the vendor knows proportionately as little about every facet and detail of your enterprise as you know about every facet and detail of their technology and services. In essence, you have witnessed "a demo" of their technology and they have experienced "a demo" of what your company is like. Therefore, it is incumbent upon you, as the buyer, to beware – caveat emptor. You and your team must thoroughly and precisely know what you want and need the technology vendor to do in order to effect the change you have in mind – the change derived from your Current Reality Tree that will help your company reach more of its goal of making more money.

At this point, an "on the other hand" would be nice to hear. Am I right?

On the other hand, there actually is an upside to this mutual blindness between technology seller and technology buyer. Frequently I have experienced situations where, as the vendor and the buyer learned more about each other's technologies (on the one side) and operational requirements (on the other), fresh new insights emerged about how the buying firm could leverage to great advantage previously undisclosed features or functions in the technology. A management team employing the value-based New ERP approach can readily see that the presence of some unanticipated feature, function or capability might radically increase the value proposition to the organization. Unfortunately, this kind of value serendipity is sometimes missed entirely by tradition-bound managers and vendors totally enmeshed in "meeting documented requirements," deadlines and budgets.

[To be continued]

©2008, 2009 Richard D. Cushing

The New ERP – Part 20

Getting to the "system" view of the organization

We will talk more about this when we get to the matter of customizations and modifications; however, if the organization is brought together to see that what is needed is an improvement in the effectiveness of the whole organization – i.e., the "system" – in order to achieve more of the goal of making more money, then many of the petty so-called "requirements" may quite naturally fall away.

When I am applying the New ERP – Extended Readiness for Profit with my clients, I frequently have a very frank discussion with the management team about our holist (or "system") view of the organization. In the course of these discussions, I try to point out that, in general, the goal of any improvement is to achieve at least one of the following three things for the whole system:

1. Increase Throughput (T)
   
2. Reduce Inventories or demands for new Investment (I)
   
3. Cut or hold the line on Operating Expenses (OE) while sustaining substantial growth
   

The caveat to that statement is that achieving that end as the result of any given change in the system (i.e., the organization) will not necessarily mean that the level of effort in every functional area will be decreased. In fact, although it is rare, it is possible that a change may lead to some increase in level of effort in a department or departments that already have excess capacity.

I find that, if the executive management team has created and has a full understanding of the impact of their own Current Reality Tree (CRT) – and maybe a Transition Tree (TrT) – the executives' use of the CRT (and TrT) in explaining what needs to change and why to the whole organization usually results in excellent buy-in on the matter of any workload redistribution that may result.

Getting to the "system" view of technology deployment projects

While we are on the subject of seeing your organization as a "system" – that is, from a holist point of view – we want to compare another important difference between the traditional – Everything Replacement Project approach to technology deployments with the approach we take with the New ERP – Extended Readiness for Profit.

The traditional method applied in most IT deployments under management internally or by vendors or resellers is what we call the aim-and-shoot approach. In a (usually vain) effort to minimize risk, the general concept is to get all the details "nailed down" before management turns vendors and resources loose on the work. Executives and managers who hold to this approach sincerely believe that they are acting in the best interests of their firm. Managers from vendors and resellers also generally hold with all sincerity that this approach is the "safest," if nothing else. But let us take a look at just what risk it is that this approach seeks to minimize.

As we said, the way the traditional approach is formulated, the project leadership attempts to "nail down" or "cast in concrete" all the pertinent details as early in the project as possible. Frequently, executives and managers on both sides try to get every detail settled before the final agreement is signed for services. From that point, their thinking is, all they have to do is follow what has been defined to the letter and they will hit their "target" of success at the end of the project.

It is possible that taking this approach minimizes the risk of cost-overruns. (Although, there is a virtual plethora of data available from the experience of thousands of companies over the last 25 years that militates strongly against this concept that this approach actually does reduce the frequency or size of cost-overruns.) More importantly, however, is the very fact that applying the term "cost-overrun" strongly suggests that the project is being measured solely by "cost" and not by "value delivered." Rather than thinking about the value created through increasing T, or reducing I or OE (if you don't know what T, I and OE mean, yet, then go back and read some earlier posts in this series), such managers and executives can conceive of no concept greater than "cost" by which to set goals and measure "success."

Let me assert right now: Any project that is ON-TIME, ON-BUDGET, and of HIGH QUALITY is still a failure – not a "success" – if it fails to increase the system's production of T, or fails to reduce the system's values of I or OE while sustaining significant growth.

[To be continued]