Uncertainty: The Elephant in the Room

Not long ago I was fortunate enough to have a conversation with two very fine gentlemen in the software business. They were part of an organization well-recognized for its leadership as a reseller and a developer providing an ERP (enterprise resource planning) solution for Tier 2 and upper-crust SMB firms.

As part of the conversation, I mentioned the fact that uncertainty is “the elephant in the room” throughout the IT (information technology) business.

What I meant by that is this: while the sales process is underway, it all too frequently happens that the two parties have differing views of the uncertainty involved in any project that might be undertaken as a result of their conversation. While they hold these differing views, however, they almost never speak openly and explicitly about the uncertainty itself.

My experience shows me that these two parties hold views of the uncertainty that take shape somewhat along these lines:

• The Client or, more correctly, at this stage in the process, “the prospect” may believe that there is very little uncertainty about which to be concerned. After all, he and his organization have tried to be forthcoming with the reseller. They have answered all the questions the resellers’ folks have raised from the first day they met, and they have done so as directly as possible.
  
  Because “the prospect” feels this way, the only “uncertainty” he may feel about any proposed agreement is whether the reseller is capable of delivering on all the promises he has made over the course of the negotiations.
  
  Also, since “the prospect” will hold the checkbook during the project execution, he feels pretty sure that he can force the reseller into assuming whatever uncertainty might remain in the anticipated project.
  
• The Reseller has been through this many, many times. He is well aware that every project is full of uncertainty. A short list of the uncertainties in the reseller’s mind might look like this:
  • Have we asked enough questions?
  • Have we asked the right questions?
  • What don’t we know that we should know about this company and how it works?
  • Can the modifications we anticipate be completed in the time we have estimated?
  • Will the prospect’s company allow this project to proceed in the time we have estimated, or will their inefficiencies, indecision or other operational problems cause us to incur unanticipated time and expenses?
    

Accidentally induced uncertainties

W. Edwards Deming once summed up very succinctly the uncertainty included in all human communications. Following a meeting between two parties, as one party was exiting the room, Deming turned to the manager he was consulting and said, “We know what we told him, but we don’t know what he heard.”

Communications between two human beings are full of such foibles. The fact that the reseller’s salesperson does not believe that he has made any “promises” upon which the reseller cannot readily deliver does not mean that the prospect has not heard “promises” that are very different from what was intended by the salesperson.

Under such circumstances, there is—more likely than not—no intention by the reseller’s sales team to mislead the prospect. Neither, most likely, is there any intent by the prospect (now, client) to somehow misconstrue what was said in order to take undue advantage of the reseller.

Nevertheless, such accidentally induced uncertainties too frequently lead to cost overruns, hard feelings between the reseller and the client, and—sometimes—even to failed projects.

Why don’t we talk about it?

My question is simple: When it comes to IT projects (or any kind of projects, for that matter), and whether it is a relationship between an external IT provider or an internal customer relationship, why do we so often ignore “the elephant in the room”?

Why are both the customer and the supplier both so reluctant to speak explicitly about the uncertainties that almost inevitably affect a project of any significance or size?

Let me know your thoughts. Thanks.

ERP Vendors and Customers: The Blind Leading the Blind

Writing in CIO UK magazine online, David Henderson’s article entitled “Why IT vendors must raise their game” makes several salient points. Not least among the points raised is the fact that “too many IT vendor sales personnel don’t really understand my underlying business processes and investment criteria….”

For me, however, the issue is somewhat stood on its head. Far too many business enterprises with which I have been involved have precisely the same problem internally. CEOs, CFOs and CIOs in many businesses buy new technologies without understanding their own underlying business processes and by what criteria they should invest.

What executives and managers should know

Executives and managers seeking ways to improve their business enterprises (read: make more money tomorrow than they are making today) too often buy new technologies out of “hope” or “desperation,” rather than with a clear and concise understanding of

1. WHAT needs to change in order for the business to begin making more money tomorrow than it is making today;
   
2. What the change should LOOK LIKE; or
   
3. HOW to effect the change (including what role any new or upgraded technologies might play in delivering the improvement).

Since they do not have the tools to concisely analyze what needs to change in order to make more money tomorrow, then they cannot know what the change should look like or how to bring about the change effectively. So, in the absence of clarity, they grope about in their darkness hoping that some change – any change – will bring them their desired end of higher profits.

Blind leading the blind

Like the blind leading the blind, the technology vendors and resellers who do not fully understand their prospects’ underlying business processes or appropriate criteria for investment (in fact, they understand them less clearly than the executives and managers, in many cases), console the yearning executives with platitudes and “rules of thumb” about how their latest and greatest “gee-whiz” technology will “reduce costs by X percent” and “improve sales by Y percent.”

Of course, this is precisely what the executives want to hear. Like the Sirens of old, the vendors and resellers lead many to spend. Even if they don’t fully believe what they are hearing from the vendors and VARs, the executives and managers frequently do not take time to calculate with any precision just how or why the new technology should, could, or would produce a return on investment (ROI) in their particular organization and circumstances. Instead, they close their eyes and ears to any negative thinking and, In the absence of any better ideas, these executives take out their checkbook to purchase the latest and greatest of new technologies. Of course, the correct general ledger account to which this “investment” should be charged is “Hope and Earnest Expectation.”

Serendipity

Sometimes good things come of this method. According to the industry literature, we can say that about one out of three such “investments” lead to noticeable improvement. Many times, however, the measure of improvement cannot be known with certainty. A growing company that shows improvement after some implementation cannot know which results may have occurred even in the absence of the new technology. A far greater share of SMBs (small-to-mid-sized businesses) simply assume they are “better off” if they are not clearly “worse off” following the deployment of some new technology. Some merely breathe a sigh of relief after some trying implementation period and, like a good Calvinist, say, “I’m glad that’s over,” without ever looking back to measure their return on investment.

My argument, however, is that “hope” and “serendipity” are not strategies and, while a few companies come to excel and even to dominate some markets for a short period of time based on little more than serendipity, it is not a sound strategy for long-term growth in any enterprise. For executives and managers return on investment should be seen as a primary responsibility. This responsibility should not be handed over to the technology vendor or VAR (value-added reseller). Neither should it be left to chance.

As W. Edwards Deming said so clearly: “It is management’s job to know.”

It is management’s job to figure out WHAT needs to change in order to start making more money tomorrow than the firm is making today. It is management’s job to come to a clear understanding as what that change should look like when it occurs. And, it is management’s job to define an unambiguous roadmap to effecting the necessary change. Then, it should be management’s job to measure and report on the return on investment yielded by their own keen insight.

Need help with this? Contact me at rcushing(at)GeeWhiz2ROI(dot)com and let’s talk.

©2010 Richard D. Cushing

Collective Fixation on Short-Term Profits

Vivek Sehgal brings up an important point in the post Putting Your Money Where Your Mouth Is (3 March 2010) here at Supply Chain Expert Commnity. Even though, at GeeWhiz To R.O.I. I talk a lot about the the goal of business being to make more money, I generally add ...tomorrow than you are making today. Making more money "tomorrow," should not be predicated on actions that will diminish the long-term prospects for making more money. Nevertheless, a lot of companies -- especially publicly traded companies -- have a fixation on short-term profits that is damaging to the long-term health of the enterprise.

W. Edwards Deming diagnosed this issue early and brought it to our attention about 30 years ago. He called it "paper entrepreneurialism." The investing relationship of real entrepreneurs looks like this:

Entrepreneurs sitting in this relationship have a vested interest in the ability of the firm to produce profits over the long term. Such investor-entrepreneurs seldom intentionally make decisions to reap short-term profits at the expense of the long-term prospects for the business.

Speculative investors have a slightly different relationship with the firm(s) in which they take stock. That relationships looks like this:

The most connected investors are those that hold a relationship similar to that of the real entrepreneurs. They invest in shares directly with the company (or at least have an more intimate relationships with the firm and knowledge of its management, even if they must make their stock acquisitions through a broker). However, most of the investors agreed to buy stock in the specific firms based on the advice of their broker. They may know little or nothing about the firm or the firm's management directly. They trust the advice of their broker.

The intervention of the broker/brokerage house makes buying and selling of stocks easier, and the brokers are typically incented to produce results (return on investment) for their customers (the shareholders) over both the short-term and long-term. The focus of the broker and the guidance given to the investors will vary based on personal preferences. Nevertheless, it is easy to see that the investors are abstracted from their investments by the borkers and management at the publicly held companies must satisfy the short-term expectations of the brokers or, in the interest of their customers, the brokers are likely to shift investment away from companies performing poorly in the short-term in favor of those with better short-term returns on investment.

Paper entrepreneurs are even further abstracted from their holdings as shown in the following diagram:

With the introduction of mutual funds and government-incented retirement plans, more capital has moved into the markets, but at the price of having the investors abstracted from the companies in which their dollars are invested by three or four layers, which layers tend to be focused entirely on short-term performance and profitability. By a huge factor, a majority of the investors in today's capital markets do not even know the names of the companies in which they hold stock. How can they be anything but "paper entrepreneurs"?  They seek the highest return on their investments without any concern for the long-term viability of the companies providing the returns.


Consider that the mutual fund manager. He care not one whit for the companies in which the fund he manages invests beyond the companies' ability to provide solid growth for the mutual fund over the next reporting period. He will gladly shift millions from company A to company B at the hint that company B's short-term return will outstrip company A's performance.

Next in line come the brokers and the brokerage houses. They are willing to recommend mutual fund C over mutual fund D on the basis of their likelihood of producing short-term returns to the investors. The brokers and brokerage houses are incented to provide this kind of advice without consideration for the long-term survivability of the companies which their investments ultimately reside.

Then, of course, for the vast majority of investors, there are the corporate retirement and pension fund managers. They, too, have only one incentive: to see good performance in the funds they manage. They, like the investors themselves, quite often have no knowledge -- ultimately -- about the companies in which their investments ultimately are put to use.

All of this leads to the boards of directors in publicly-held companies providing incentives to their chief executives to provide short-term profitability so as to keep market capitalization up -- which is almost entirely based on stock prices. So, how do CEOs and CFOs react to all of this? They are willing to sacrifice the long-term prospects of their own organization for short-term performance during the particular CEO's or CFO's term in office -- and their successors will do the same.

This constitutes a grave danger to publicly-held companies in the U.S.  What is the answer?

Contact me!

Surviving the recession with breakthrough thinking - Part 1

If there is one thing you need to survive and thrive during a recession, it is a competitive advantage. And if there is one thing that can help you and your organization discover and secure a sustainable competitive advantage, it is breakthrough thinking. But how do you and your management team go about conjuring up a breakthrough? After all, the very word "breakthrough" indicates that there is a barrier between you and "the other side" of the breakthrough. How will you break through?

Become an expert on "the solution," not "the problem"
Over my career of more than 25 years in consulting and senior management, I have met lots of executives and managers that believe that "data" is central to improving a company. They did not have this same thought before computers became widely available to small-to-mid-sized business enterprises (SMEs). It seems that as PC-based computing and storage became faster and cheaper, managers' and executives' hunger for data grew. If some data was helpful, then (it seems they reasoned) all the data would make them infallible in their management actions.

The data are not right
What many of these executives and managers fail to understand, however, is that it is impossible for the data they collect to be right all of the time. To paraphrase P.T. Barnum: Some of the data will be right all of the time, and all of the data will be right some of the time; but, all of the data will never be right all of the time.

You will never possess all of the data
Of course, we need to add to that the fact that no one will ever possess all of the data in any given situation, if for no other reason than that there are hundreds of data elements affecting any given situation that are not quantifiable and cannot be reduced to empirical data points in a computer.

The data are not objective or impartial
Even the data that is collected may not be objective. How the data is collected, the programming that went into the computer application that collects it, the operator who enters it, the people making the measurements, and even the staff that categorize, select and report on the data are all potential influencers of the end result. The reports, dashboards or presentations that many executives will consider as being "neutral," "objective," and "impartial" really may have none of these attributes.

You are wasting time, energy and moneyFor all of these reasons and more, executives and managers that seek to amass volumes of data in order to solve problems are wasting the three things most companies can least afford to use unwisely: time, energy and money. Not only so, but too much data is more often a hindrance than a benefit to breakthrough problem-solving. The executives seeking a solution are more often than not simply buried in the minutia - much of it being unmanageable and irrelevant to the underlying core problem. The result is "paralysis by analysis."

Data-gathering is not accomplishment
Sadly, far too many executives and managers equate information gathering with actually accomplishing something that benefits the organization even though the act cannot be linked to increasing Throughput, reducing Inventories or demand for new Investment, and/or cutting or holding the line on Operating Expenses while sustaining significant growth. This approach to problem-solving frequently reports "progress" without any real accomplishment leading to improvement - short-term or otherwise.

Missing the goal and a frameworkIn management's misplaced attempt to become an expert on "the problem" through data-collection, they have already taken a wrong turn. Management should not be in the business of becoming expert on "the problem." They should be seeking to become expert on "the solution." However, their mistaken belief is that the data will lead them to a solution. This, however, is highly unlikely.

Data is nothing more than documented experience - the organization's history having been captured as data. However, as W. Edwards Deming told us so clearly:

• "Information is not knowledge. Knowledge comes from theory." 
• "You should not ask questions without knowledge."
• "There is no knowledge without theory."
• "Experience teaches nothing without theory."
• "If you do not know how to ask the right question, you discover nothing."

Managers busy amassing and combing through data frequently have neither a goal nor a theory in mind. They are, as Deming would say, "Asking questions without knowledge." They are seeking to be "taught" by the firm's experience (as captured in the data) without a theory about what the data should be showing them.

Begin with a goal
It is the awareness of a goal or purpose that will enable managers to determine what data might really be relevant to achieving a breakthrough.

Firefighting does not qualify as a goal
Firefighting might be a requirement, but it cannot qualify as "a goal." I say this because - like real, honest-to-goodness firefighting - the most it can do is minimize damage and restore the "normal condition" of "no fire." It cannot bring progress, let alone lead to breakthrough thinking and competitive advantage for your company.
 
If your executive team is going to achieve breakthrough thinking, then the breakthrough better be about something more important to your organization's success than how to put out - or even prevent - the next fire in department X. Your thinking had better be focused on the critical matters of achieving more of your goal - and, in a for-profit enterprise, that goal should be how to make more money tomorrow than you are making today. Any other goal is short-sighted: improving quality, improving customer service, and even making happier, more satisfied employees are require making money if they are to be done well and for very long.
 
So, if the goal is making more money tomorrow than you are making today, what are the right questions to ask and what is the theory (or framework) in which to ask those questions in order that you and your management team might come away with real and practical knowledge leading to breakthrough improvements?

The theory and the goal
Let us begin with this hypothesis: Every for-profit organization has at least one constraint to making more money. Of course, the evidence supporting this hypothesis is that if at least one for-profit organization existed with no constraint, its profits would be approaching infinity. The resulting theory - set forth by Eliyahu Goldratt more than 25 years ago - is called the theory of constraints, or TOC.

There are many nuances to understanding all of the implications of this theory and it is beyond the scope of this present writing to discuss them all. However, it seems simple enough as a concept: the organization - the "system" - is, in a for-profit situation, nothing more than a "money-making" or "profit-making" machine. Therefore, the following two statements should be considered:

1. The "system" - the entire organization - should be considered as a whole and not managed piecemeal by department and function. It is the "system" that produces profit, not the individual products, processes, departments or functions. The constraint is - or constraints are - related to the "system" and should be addressed in the context of the "system." 
2. In order for the "system" to make more money tomorrow than it is making today, it is important that the following occur:
1. IDENTIFY the constraint(s)
2. EXPLOIT the constraint(s) - i.e., take steps to get the most Throughput available under the current constraint(s)
3. SUBORDINATE to the constraint(s) - i.e., subordinate all other decision-making across the organization to the governing factors surrounding the constraint(s)
4. ELEVATE the constraint(s) - i.e., take steps to expand the capacity(ies) of capacity-constrained resources (CCRs)
5. CHECK to see if the constraint has moved - i.e., see if you now have a different constraint or set of constraint(s)
6. GO BACK to the first step - do not let inertia set in; enter into a POOGI (process of ongoing improvement)

Now you can start thinking - wisely
Now, with a theory in-hand (the theory of constraints) and a goal in mind (making more money tomorrow than you are making today), you and your management team are actually ready to begin "thinking" toward a breakthrough.

[To be continued]
 
©2010 Richard D. Cushing

The New ERP - Part 3

Failure No. 3: Substantial -- sometimes even huge -- budget overruns
Unfortunately, the causes of the "go-live" delays typically are also the major contributors to exorbitant budget overruns, too. Executives and managers that have lost sight of specific and measurable objectives -- or they never had any such objectives in mind from the beginning -- are likely to make many foolish decisions related to customizations and modifications. Having lost focus -- or never having had any focus -- such projects will soon take on a life of their own. Managers may be incapable of bringing them back under control without the direst of actions.

Failure No. 4: Stopping or slowing production and delivery
This is clearly the worst-case scenario: the very technology investment undertaken with some vague and likely unquantified hope of delivering business advantages becomes an albatross around the neck of the whole organization. Rather than delivering a "sustainable business advantage," the new technology bogs down or stops the organization's ability to produce Throughput entirely.

Almost without exception, this dire result can be traced back to a poor understanding of the organization's real situation prior to the decision to deploy new technologies. The circumstances may be further aggravated by the fact that the organization did not obtain a valid proof-of-concept from the technology vendor before the purchasing decision was made and the Everything Replacement Project (traditional ERP) undertaken.


The Everything Replacement Project (traditional ERP) decision to buy

Since the introduction of the computer especially, executives and managers with money to spend on technologies have often carried about within themselves a peculiar mindset. That mindset tells them, "If I just had more data; if I just knew more details about my enterprise, then I could manage better. In fact, if I could know in detail everything about my enterprise, then I could manage perfectly."

Of course, traditional ERP (Everthing Replacement Project) vendors prey on this mindset. In fact, they often help instill and solidify this mindset within their prospects and clients. As a result, the decision-making process regarding whether executives and managers should buy new or more technology often follows along these lines:

There are at least two incorrect assumptions in this chain of reasoning.

The first wrong assumption is that "information" is the key to better management. Information is not the key to better management. Knowledge is the key to better management and information is not knowledge.

Data gathered and presented by technology is a representation of what your organization has experienced. That experience (history) may include what you sold, some cost data, some profit data, data about your expenses, and so forth. However, as W. Edwards Deming put it so plainly, "Experience teaches you nothing without theory." He also said, "Knowledge comes from theory."

[To be continued]

Contact me!

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